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“International law is not a suicide pact.”
1
— Luis René Beres
“Today it is more likely to be foolish, if not suicidal, for a state . . . to
wait until the first attack.”
2
— Miriam Sapiro
INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 2003, the United States and a coalition of its allies
3
attacked Iraq, a sovereign nation and a member of the United
4
Nations. It is undisputed that the United States was not responding
to an Iraqi attack on the United States or any other coalition
5
member. One of its justifications for invading Iraq was the Bush
Administration’s insistence that Iraq posed a military threat to other
countries, including the United States, and that the United States was
acting preemptively to prevent Iraq from using non-conventional
6
weapons against these nations. In recent history, there have been
1. Luis René Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 31 (1994).
2. Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L
L. 599, 602 (2003).
3. See President George W. Bush, Presidential Address to the Nation (Mar. 19,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/2003031917.html (announcing the beginning of military operations in Iraq by a coalition of
over thirty-five countries led by the United States).
4. See Ulrich Fastenrath, Article 3, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 155, 157-58 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1995) (listing Iraq as one of the
fifty-one founding members of the United Nations and noting that it signed the
Declaration of the United Nations on January 16, 1943).
5. See Bush, supra note 3 (stating that the purpose of the attack on Iraq was to
remove the threat posed by Iraq’s “outlaw regime” having “weapons of mass murder”
before that threat could manifest itself on American soil, and stating that the goal of
the military campaign against Iraq was “to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to
defend the world from grave danger”).
6. See Letter from John D. Negroponte, Permanent Representative of the
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other instances of countries relying on their right to self-defense to
7
justify acts of war, but the United States’ intervention in Iraq has
brought renewed controversy to the question of whether it is ever
proper for one sovereign nation to attack another prior to an act of
8
aggression, rather than in response to one.
Recently published legal literature has noted the connection
between the United States’ legal rationale for preemptive war and the
9
imminence requirement of self-defense in criminal law.
The
imminence requirement, further discussed infra Part I.A, posits that
one may only act in self-defense if, at the time of the act, he or she
reasonably believes that there is a present or imminent danger of
United States of America to the United Nations, to the President of the United
Nations Security Council (Mar. 20, 2003), available at http://www.un.int/usa/s2003_
351.pdf (asserting that Iraq continued to breach the obligations that various Security
Council resolutions imposed on it, and that military action against Iraq was necessary
“to defend the United States and the international community from the threat posed
by Iraq”); see also President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/2003012819.html (referring to the existence of Iraq’s illegal weapons programs and its ties to
international terrorism, and stating that if Iraq failed to disarm, then the United
States would forcibly disarm it “for the safety of our people and for the peace of the
world”).
7. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 406 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (asserting
that since aggressive war had been declared a violation of international law, “nearly
every aggressive act is sought to be portrayed as an act of self-defence,” including
German and Japanese action during World War II); Sapiro, supra note 2, at 601
(observing that Israel argued in 1981 that it was justified in destroying the Iraqi
nuclear reactor at Osiraq on the basis of anticipatory self-defense because it was a
threat to Israel’s national security); Binding the Colossus, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2003, at
25, 26 (noting that Israel used preemptive self-defense as justification for attacking
Egypt and its Arab allies in the war of 1967); infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text
(discussing Germany’s justification of its attack of Norway during World War II as an
act of preemptive self-defense from future Allied aggression).
8. See Joseph S. Nye, Before War, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2003, at A27 (asserting
that, because the “Bush doctrine of preventive war . . . represents a dramatic
departure in American history, it is crucial that we set the right precedent”); Sapiro,
supra note 2, at 599 (explaining the author’s aim to analyze the compatibility of the
preemptive war doctrine with existing international law, for while the principles of
anticipatory self-defense were already relatively controversial, the use of these
principles by the United States in the war in Iraq made it a “critical question with
implications far beyond Iraq”).
9. See RICHARD G. SINGER & JOHN Q. LA FOND, CRIMINAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 406 (3d ed. 2004) (questioning whether the U.S. government’s
justifications for preemptively striking Iraq would stand up to the scrutiny accorded
to self-defense claims in criminal law); see also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending
Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 215 (2004) (contending
that the Bush Administration’s “attack” on the imminence requirement of selfdefense in international law is evocative of arguments generally made in the debate
about the relaxation of the imminence requirement in criminal self-defense law);
Shana Wallace, Comment, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law and Battered
Women’s Right to Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2004) (suggesting that the
factors the Bush Administration adopted to justify preemptive strikes are related to
the requirements of individual self-defense).
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10

physical harm.
One line of thought is that the Bush
Administration’s claim that the war was necessary to prevent Iraq
from attacking the United States or its allies with non-conventional
11
weapons would not satisfy a strict self-defense analysis.
Other
authors have postulated that the Bush Administration’s justification
for the war in Iraq could lead to more challenges to, or a possible
relaxation of, the imminence requirement of self-defense in criminal
12
proceedings.
This Comment argues that the traditional legal
requirements of self-defense should not be imposed on self-defense
in international law. Focusing on the doctrine of anticipatory self13
defense, this Comment asserts that its imminence requirement
should be broadened to reflect the destructive capacity of modern
weapons, the increasing number of non-state actors involved in
international conflicts, and other related factors.
The parallels between preemptive war and the doctrine of selfdefense are especially relevant in the context of Battered Woman
14
Syndrome (“BWS”), a psychological condition sometimes used to
support a battered woman’s justification for the use of preemptive
15
force against her attacker. BWS reshaped the traditional doctrine of
self-defense to reflect conditions faced by battered women in their
abusive relationships and their unfavorable treatment by the criminal
10. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (demonstrating some variations
in how different jurisdictions codify and apply the imminence requirement).
11. See, e.g., Ferzan, supra note 9, at 260-62 (noting the distinction between claims
of necessity and imminence in self-defense, and asserting that while self-defense laws
require a showing of imminence, the United States relied on necessity, thereby
invalidating the United States’ claim).
12. See SINGER & LA FOND, supra note 9, at 412 (noting that a preemptive strike
based on a “reasonable belief” of future aggression is usually rejected by the courts
when a battered woman kills her sleeping spouse, but that defendants seeking to
justify the use of force in self-defense outside a confrontation may challenge the
majority view by invoking the Bush Administration’s asserted right to preemptive
strikes); cf. Wallace, supra note 9, at 1751 (recommending that the Bush
Administration’s broadened definition of imminence be incorporated into the
criminal law definition of self-defense).
13. The term “anticipatory self-defense,” as used throughout this Comment,
refers to a nation’s use of force to prevent an attack rather than in response to one.
Although there is no precise legal definition for this term, it is commonly used by
scholars and commentators; infra Part I.C further discusses the development of
anticipatory self-defense in the context of self-defense in international law.
14. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004) (defining battered-woman
syndrome as “[a] constellation of medical and psychological conditions of a woman
who has suffered physical, sexual, or emotional abuse at the hands of a spouse or
lover”); see also infra Part I.B (describing BWS and discussing its use in criminal selfdefense claims).
15. See, e.g., Ferzan, supra note 9, at 215-16 (comparing the relaxation of the
imminence requirement in anticipatory self-defense and self-defense involving BWS,
and drawing further parallels between the claims in each of these settings justifying
defensive action because harm was otherwise inevitable).
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16

justice system. Notwithstanding the criticisms of BWS, its use and
17
acceptance by the judicial system has effectively broadened the
temporal aspect of imminence in self-defense claims and
demonstrates that the traditional requirements of self-defense,
18
although rigid, can indeed evolve over time.
Anticipatory selfdefense in international law should similarly wean itself from strict
traditional self-defense requirements and assume the characteristics
of a related but distinct legal doctrine flexible enough to address
issues specific to international conflicts and relations.
Part I of this Comment introduces the elements of self-defense in
criminal law and describes BWS and its use in legal proceedings. It
also discusses the history of anticipatory self-defense and its ties to
self-defense in criminal law. Part II explores the shortcomings of
customary international law and the ambiguities raised by Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations in relation to anticipatory selfdefense. Part II then examines the legal similarities between States
that initiate preemptive strikes and battered women who attack their
abusers. Based on this analogy, Part II argues that international law
should not adhere to strict traditional self-defense requirements
because of the evolving nature of international conflicts. In
conclusion, this Comment contends that the legal requirements of
anticipatory self-defense in the context of a national defense policy
must follow the lead of BWS and utilize a more flexible view of
imminence than the traditional doctrine of self-defense.
Even before American troops entered Iraq, legal scholars,
politicians, and the media were debating the legality of preemptive
war and the legitimacy of the United States’ military action against
19
Iraq under the existing legal framework. Since then, information
16. See infra notes 18 & 34 and accompanying text for a discussion of how expert
testimony describing the effects of battering on its victims has changed courts’
approach to battered women’s self-defense claims.
17. See infra note 48 (describing the acceptance of BWS by the American legal
system, while giving nod to the critics of BWS). Although the use of BWS in criminal
law has come under criticism, its frequent use in self-defense claims has made it a
valid point of reference in discussing the legal requirements of self-defense.
18. See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 753 (2004) (proposing that
another way of viewing the use of BWS in self-defense law is as an attempt to redefine
or relax the strict imminence requirement of self-defense by assessing the probability
of future harm through an analysis of the abuser’s past history of aggression); Martin
E. Veinsreideris, Comment, The Prospective Effects of Modifying Existing Law to
Accommodate Preemptive Self-Defense by Battered Women, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613-14
(2000) (suggesting that BWS cases result in the “dilution of the imminence
requirement in self-defense law”).
19. Compare Nye, supra note 8, at A27 (arguing that while the concept of
preventive war has not been accepted in international law, the Bush Administration’s
rationale for war should be justified as long as a broad coalition supports the United
States’ actions and the war is limited to Iraq and its present regime), and Press
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has surfaced which suggests that the United States used faulty or
altered intelligence in order to justify its preemptive war against
20
Saddam Hussein’s regime. The author of this Comment has strived
to remain apolitical and has avoided commenting on the legality of
the United States’ actions in order to focus on the underlying legal
21
principles. The purpose of this Comment is to analyze critically the
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense; the question of whether the
United States was justified in attacking Iraq is left for the reader to
22
decide.
I.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DEFENSE, BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME, AND ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE
A. The History and Evolution of Self-Defense Laws and Principles

The legal concept of self-defense has its roots in early philosophical
works dealing with the relationship between individuals and the law,
Release, Senator Rick Santorum, U.S. Senator Rick Santorum Issues Statement
Regarding the War with Iraq (Mar. 20, 2003), available at http://santorum.senate.gov
/public/ (select “Press Office—Press Releases” from drop-down menu; then select
“browse by” “March 2003”; then follow “03/20/03” hyperlink) (expressing support
for President Bush’s actions as well as the opinion that all options outside of military
action had been exhausted), with George E. Bisharat, Facing Tyranny With Justice:
Alternatives to War in the Confrontation with Iraq, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 45-46, 6173 (2003) (criticizing the United States’ given reasons for invading Iraq and
providing policy alternatives to war), and Press Release, Senator Edward Kennedy,
Statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy on American Values and War with Iraq
(Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://kennedy.senate.gov/~kennedy/statements/03/0
3/2003317746.html (citing Saint Thomas Aquinas’ requirements for a “just war” and
questioning the legitimacy of the United States’ invasion of Iraq).
20. See Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, Press Gaggle (July 7, 2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030707-5.html
(admitting that information about Iraq attempting to buy yellow cake uranium from
Niger, which was incorporated into President Bush’s State of the Union address as
part of the justification for war with Iraq, “turn[ed] out to be a forgery”); see also
Baghdad’s Bombs, and London’s, ECONOMIST, July 23, 2005, at 13, 14 (characterizing the
coalition’s case for war as having been “sex[ed] up” by the United States’ and its
allies’ exaggeration of intelligence concerning Iraq’s program of weapons of mass
destruction); cf. Christopher Hitchens, A War to Be Proud Of, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 5,
2005, at 24, 26 (suggesting that the war in Iraq was justified for reasons other than
those originally proposed by the United States and Britain, and remarking that “it
must be admitted that Bush and Blair made a hash of a good case, largely because
they preferred to scare people rather than enlighten them or reason with them”).
21. To this end, the assertions made by commentators and parties to various
international conflicts, which may at times be biased, are taken at face value so as to
focus on the underlying legal principles.
22. A proper determination of the legitimacy, under international law, of the
United States’ invasion of Iraq is a topic that requires much information that is not
publicly available. Basing this determination on the official statements of the United
States and other governments involved, which may have been manipulated for
political purposes, or on other unverified conjectures, would be a political statement
inconsistent with the goals of this Comment.
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which recognized that the immediacy of a threat sometimes made it
23
impractical for the victim to seek help from legal authorities. By the
eighteenth century, self-defense was an established part of English
24
law. English common law recognized two types of self-defense, one
25
being a justification defense, and one an excuse. Both of these

23. As early as the thirteenth century, Saint Thomas Aquinas proposed that the
use of force in self-defense was justified in the case of a risk so immediate that it
“does not allow enough time to be able to have recourse to a superior.” THOMAS
AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW 61 (Richard J. Regan ed. & trans., Hackett Publ’g Co.
2000) (1272). Aquinas asserted that only “rulers,” i.e. those who make laws, could
legitimately interpret laws. Id. at 60. But if an act was against the letter of the law
(e.g. murder), then in the absence of laws allowing for self-defense, the very necessity
of defending oneself in face of a sudden attack “include[d] an implicit dispensation,
since necessity is not subject to the law.” Id. at 60-61. Four centuries later, John
Locke reiterated Aquinas’ theory in the Second Treatise of Government, by asserting that
the law permitted self-defense, including the right to kill the aggressor, if the wouldbe victim’s life was in danger and the aggressor’s force did not leave enough time to
seek a legal remedy. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 124 (Mark Goldie
ed., Everyman 2000) (1683). However, Locke went a step further in two regards. He
justified the use of deadly force even when the would-be victim faced no deadly force
(e.g. killing a thief in defense of one’s property), because the aggressor, by violating
the victim’s rights, shows complete disregard for the law and there is “no reason to
suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty, would not when he had me in his
power, take away everything else.” Id. at 123. Locke also maintained that his selfdefense principles applied not only in response to actual force, but also in response
to “a declared design of force upon the person of another,” or in other words—
preemptively. Id. at 124.
24. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3-4 (characterizing self-defense as
“the primary law of nature,” which, even if not codified, could be resorted to in
repelling an attack on oneself, one’s family, or one’s property, and which was a valid
excuse for killing the attacker as long as the force used in self-defense did not exceed
its strictly defensive purpose). In cases of assault and battery, Blackstone explained
that one had the right to “strike in [one’s] own defence” in response to an actual
strike or assault by another, and that the law would acknowledge the fault of the
party which had initiated the confrontation. Id. *120-21. In cases of attempted
robbery, attempted murder, attempted common law burglary (i.e. the burglary of a
dwelling at night-time), attempted arson, and attempted rape, both common law and
statutory law justified the killing of the perpetrator. 4 id. *180-81. The underlying
principle that justified killing the attacker was that “where a crime, in itself capital, is
endeavoured to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force by the death of
the party attempting.” Id. at *181. It is important to take note that Blackstone
criticized Locke’s formulation of self-defense as too permissive and noted that it was
contrary to the laws of “well-regulated communit[ies]” such as England. Id. at *18182; see supra note 23 (explaining Locke’s argument that the law allowed a victim to
kill the aggressor in certain circumstances).
25. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *183-84 (noting that the first kind
of self-defense was “calculated to hinder the perpetration of a capital crime,” as
described supra note 24). This defense justified the homicide of the attacker and led
to a total acquittal of the defendant “with commendation rather than blame.” Id. at
*182. The second type of self-defense was the so-called “chance-medley,” in which a
person killed his attacker “in the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel.” Id. at *184.
This was an excusable homicide, more akin to manslaughter, because the killing
resulted from violent conduct in which both parties participated. Id. at *184-85.
What distinguished chance-medley from manslaughter was that in the former, the
defendant had to retreat as far as practically possible before using force toward his
assailant if the assailant had pressed on with the assault. Id.
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formulations recognized the right to defend oneself when facing a
26
violent assault, using as much force as necessary to repel the attack.
Early American law generally followed the established English
27
common law requirements of self-defense. Some aberrations did
28
occur, but by the end of the nineteenth century, the principles of
self-defense law in the United States were well settled and the same
29
principles remain in place today.
Although the statutory
requirements of using force in self-defense vary between jurisdictions,
the main common elements are: (1) the actor must reasonably
believe that there is a present or imminent danger of physical harm;
(2) the use of force must be necessary to prevent the harm; and
(3) no more force can be used than is reasonably necessary to defend
30
against the threat of harm.
26. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (establishing the legality of using
force in self-defense and the principles governing such use of force).
27. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 20 Iowa 569 (1866) (observing that a threat must
be actual and imminent to justify the force used in self-defense); State v. Sloan, 47
Mo. 604 (1871) (requiring a reasonable belief of imminent harm to justify the use of
reasonable force used to repel that harm). See generally Craig Evan Klafter, The
Americanization of Blackstone’s Commentaries, in ESSAYS ON ENGLISH LAW AND AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 42, 42 (Elizabeth A. Cawthon & David E. Narrett eds., 1994) (noting that
“[i]n the first century of American independence, [Blackstone’s] Commentaries were
not merely an approach to the study of law; for most lawyers they constituted all
there was of the law” (quoting DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE
LAW 3 (Harvard Univ. Press 1941))).
28. See, e.g., Philips v. Commonwealth, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 328, 331-32 (1865) (ruling
that the defendant was justified in fatally striking the deceased, because the
defendant had been a victim of a previous attack by the deceased and was attempting
to avoid future harm), overruled by Bohannon v. Commonwealth, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 481
(1871); Carico v. Commonwealth, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 124, 128-29 (1870) (deriding the
trial court’s jury instructions on self-defense as “conservative” because they had
required an element of imminent danger, and upholding the defendant’s right to
strike preventively against the deceased, who had previously assaulted the defendant
with deadly weapons and had threatened to kill him on the day of the incident).
29. See David McCord & Sandra K. Lyons, Moral Reasoning and the Criminal Law:
The Example of Self-Defense, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 97, 144 (1992) (noting that when the
Kentucky Supreme Court renounced the principle of permitting preemptive strikes,
see supra note 28, it “br[ought] Kentucky law into line with the traditional law,”
suggesting that most, if not all, other jurisdictions were already in agreement on this
subject); see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(a) (2005) (requiring that a person only
resort to deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that the force is necessary to
prevent death, serious bodily injury, or a forcible felony); Robbins v. State, 891 So. 2d
1102, 1108 (Fla. 2004) (requiring that the defendant had to have thought that death
was imminent in order to resort to deadly force in self-defense (quoting Curington v.
State, 704 So. 2d 1137, 1139-40 (Fla. 1998))).
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1390 (8th ed. 2004); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 491 (3d ed. 2000);
see Veinsreideris, supra note 18, at 615 (surveying self-defense statutes from multiple
jurisdictions and concluding that the basic principles of self-defense are the same,
albeit with “seemingly infinite linguistic variations”). Veinsreideris noted that the
Codes of some states (e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(a) (1975), COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1704(1) (1999), GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(a) (1999)) require that the threatened force
be “imminent,” while others (e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404(A) (1989), DEL.

SKOPETS.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

2/23/2006 3:43:15 PM

BATTERED NATION SYNDROME

761

B. Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers and the Role of Battered
Woman Syndrome in Their Self-Defense Claims
In the early 1980s, courts in many states started accepting expert
testimony about the effects of BWS in battered women’s self-defense
31
claims. However, as it was gaining legitimacy, BWS was still widely
32
misunderstood in the legal community.
Contrary to popular
33
misconceptions, BWS is not a defense in and of itself. Rather, BWS
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(a) (1975), 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(a) (West 1998))
use the term “immediately necessary.” Veinsreideris, supra note 18, at 616 & nn.1011. Although Veinsreideris suggested that there is an inherent distinction between
the two terms, he acknowledged that at least some courts and commentators see
them as interchangeable. Id. at 616 & n.12; see also LAFAVE, supra, at 495 & n.41
(observing that “[m]ost of the modern codes require that the defendant reasonably
perceive an ‘imminent’ use of force,” but some utilize other terminology to describe
this requirement).
31. See Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 322 (1992) (noting that between the late 1970s
and the early 1980s, BWS gained “acceptance within the case law of numerous
states,” which in turn hastened its acceptance and acknowledgement by legal and
mental health professionals); see, e.g., State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1273-75 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1986) (reversing the lower court, which had denied the defendant’s selfdefense instruction, and acknowledging that BWS was a valid basis for self-defense).
The Gallegos court found reversible error where: (1) the trial court’s objective
interpretation of the evidence contradicted the defendant’s perception of the
immediacy of the threat to her life; (2) the trial court had excluded the term
“battered wife syndrome” from expert testimony because of its novelty; and (3) the
trial court did not admit evidence of the deceased’s violent acts toward his ex-wife.
Id.
32. See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in
Criminal Cases, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 82-83 (1996) (noting that, at the time of the
study examined in this article, there existed a perception of BWS as a mental disease
or defect). As examples, Parrish mentioned two cases, one from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Ware v. Yukins, No. 93-1468, 1994 WL 59004
(6th Cir. Feb. 25, 1994), and one from the Ohio Court of Appeals, State v. Daws, 662
N.E.2d 805 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), aff’d, State v. Daws, No. 18686, 2001 WL 814968
(Ohio App. July 20, 2001), in which the courts referred to BWS as an abnormal
mental condition. Parrish, supra, at 82-83. Parrish also observed that the National
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women received a number of phone calls
exhibiting misunderstanding by many attorneys of the relevance of expert testimony
regarding the psychological effects of abuse on battered women’s perceptions to the
self-defense claims of battered women. Id. at 80. Furthermore, some women were
not able to present such testimony at trial, or when they did, courts sometimes
limited the admissibility or scope of such testimony. Id.; see also ANGELA BROWNE,
WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 177 (1987) (noting that although expert testimony on
BWS had a positive effect on people’s understanding of the mentality of battered
women, the term “syndrome” had skewed the image of battered women as suffering
from some impairment in the eyes of, among others, judges and jurors).
33. See Parrish, supra note 32, at 78 (noting that many people misunderstand the
role of BWS in trials of battered women, and while BWS is not a separate defense nor
a type of self-defense, expert testimony of the effects of BWS on battered women is
used to support a battered woman’s self-defense claim rather than to replace it); see also
State v. Meyers, 570 A.2d 1260, 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (“The Battered
Woman’s Syndrome does not involve insanity, mental disability or diminished
capacity. Rather, it bears on the self-defense issue of the honesty and reasonability of
defendant’s belief that she was in imminent danger of serious injury.”), cert. denied,
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is employed within the framework of self-defense and expert
testimony describing the effects of battering on a woman’s mental
state helps the jury understand the defendant’s perception that she
34
was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm.
BWS gained prominence against a background in which selfdefense laws were generally unresponsive to situations faced by
35
female victims of domestic violence.
Traditional common law
allowed men to physically discipline their wives and denied women
36
the right to defend themselves, but the practice of wife beating was
37
not upheld in later jurisprudence.
However, while the law had
evolved beyond encouraging men to abuse their spouses, it still did
604 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1990).
34. See Parrish, supra note 32, at 78-79 (explaining how the role of expert
testimony in self-defense claims involving BWS helps judges and juries “understand
the defendant’s experiences and actions, not excuse them”). Parrish clarified that
expert testimony is meant to assist the fact-finder in understanding the “social
context” of the killing, and its ultimate purpose is to “promote[] fair trials.” Id. at 79.
Parrish compared a battered woman’s self-defense claim to any other self-defense
claim in which the defendant should be able to and should want to introduce
evidence of why “the defendant reasonably believed that she was in imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm.” Id. at 79. This evidence should include the
deceased’s history of violence toward the defendant as well as an explanation of the
general psychological effects of battering on the victim, so that the jury may “fairly
evaluate the situation at the time of the incident.” Id. at 79-80.
35. See Walker, supra note 31, at 321 (noting that before BWS was accepted by the
legal community, most women who admitted to killing their abusers were advised by
their attorneys to plead guilty to murder, and that usually the only defense that these
women would be allowed to present was some variation of the insanity defense).
36. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L. J. 2117, 2123-24 (1996) (observing that antebellum common law allowed
a husband to subject his wife to corporal punishment if she disobeyed him). Siegel
qualified her point by observing that in his Commentaries Blackstone noted this legal
tradition’s entrenchment with the British lower classes but was otherwise seemingly
critical of it, and that early American legal treatises, such as Kent’s Commentaries of
1827 and Wharton’s criminal law treatise of 1846, “recognized th[is] prerogative in
qualified terms.” Id. at 2124. At the same time, however, the case law of many states
recognized the husband’s right to use physical force to chastise his wife. See id. at
2125 n.25 (surveying a number of cases from early and mid-nineteenth century
affirming this right, albeit with various limitations on the amount of force used and
the reasons behind it). One such case is Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156
(1824), in which the court referred to the infamous guideline, commonly known as
the “rule of thumb,” which allowed a husband legally to chastise his wife with a rod,
so long as its diameter was no greater than that of his thumb. Id. at 157.
37. See Siegel, supra note 36, at 2129 (observing that “[b]y the 1870s, there was no
judge or treatise writer in the United States who recognized a husband’s prerogative
to chastise his wife”); see, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 147 (1871) (repudiating
a husband’s authority to physically chastise his wife by holding that a wife is entitled
to the same protection of the law as the husband). The Court in Fulgham observed
that Blackstone’s Commentaries referred to the practice of “wife-whipping” as an
“ancient privilege,” but because Blackstone’s claims lacked supporting case law and
because “learning, with its humanizing influences, ha[d] made great progress [since
the publication of the Commentaries,]” “the exercise of a rude privilege [in England
was] no excuse for a like privilege [in the United States].” Id. at 146 (citations
omitted).
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not offer enough legal protection to women in abusive
38
While many battered women were killed by their
relationships.
39
abusive partners, some fought back and killed their abusers. Courts
40
in these cases often refused to admit evidence of past abuse. Thus,
it was more difficult for a battered woman to meet the requirements
of self-defense as the jury necessarily evaluated the imminence
requirement from an objective viewpoint since it was not privy to the
41
woman’s perceptions as a victim in an abusive relationship.
The admissibility of expert testimony of BWS was first reviewed by
42
43
an appellate court in Ibn-Tamas v. United States in 1979. The trial
court had ruled that expert testimony of BWS was prejudicial and
interfered with the jury’s fact-finding function, thus refusing to admit
44
it. The appellate court, however, reasoned that expert psychological
testimony about battered women could educate the jury about the
45
defendant’s possible state of mind as a victim of spousal abuse. The
38. See Parrish, supra note 32, at 80 (noting that in 1996, when Parrish’s article
was written, many attorneys and courts lacked familiarity with battered women’s
cases, meaning battered women “continue[d] to face monumental hurdles” as
criminal defendants claiming self-defense); Walker, supra note 31, at 321 (describing
some problems that battered women faced in the legal system); cf. Ferzan, supra note
9, at 231 (stating that battered women who kill in confrontational settings are
“paying the price for our failure to delineate the defense [of self-defense] properly”
and are usually sentenced to relatively lengthy prison terms).
39. See LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND
HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 4-7 (1989) (noting that as an expert witness in over 150
murder trials involving BWS, the author encountered women who had killed their
partners in order to save their own lives or those of their children “after enduring
incredible physical, sexual, psychological, and emotional abuse and torture”).
40. See Walker, supra note 31, at 325-26 (explaining battered women’s difficulties
in presenting evidence of their abusers’ past behaviors, which could justify their use
of deadly force in self-defense).
41. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9-14 (N.C. 1989) (finding that the
imminence requirement needed for a successful self-defense claim was not satisfied
because there was no “reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm,” even
though a psychologist and psychiatrist who presented expert testimony on the
defendant’s behalf stated that “killing her husband ‘appeared reasonably necessary’ to the
defendant at the time of the homicide”) (emphasis added); see also Walker, supra note
31, at 323-24 (noting that the effect of using an objective “reasonable person”
requirement meant that the jury would evaluate the woman’s claim through the eyes
of an average person rather than a victim of spousal abuse, and that without expert
testimony on the effect of abuse on the defendant’s thoughts, feelings and actions,
the jury would likely find the defendant’s perceptions unreasonable).
42. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
43. DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATTERED WOMEN, THE
SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND THE LAW 78 (1996) (noting the significance of Ibn-Tamas as
the first appellate decision in BWS jurisprudence).
44. Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 632.
45. Id. at 634-35. The court reasoned that the expert witness could explain the
effects that a history of being subjected to battering and abuse may have on a
battered woman’s mental state, and “would have supplied an interpretation of the
facts which differed from the ordinary lay perception [that a battered woman can
freely get out of the relationship with her batterer].” Id.
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defendant would then gain credibility in the eyes of the jury, making
her claim that she believed her husband would kill her and she had
46
no alternative but to act in self-defense more plausible. The IbnTamas trial court retained the discretion to decide whether expert
47
BWS testimony would be admitted, but generally, by the mid-1990s
most American jurisdictions accepted evidence of BWS in battered
48
women’s self-defense claims.
C. Defensive Needs of Nations and the Evolution of Anticipatory
Self-Defense Principles in International Law
The principles of self-defense in international law are similar to the
requirements of individual self-defense, but rules governing national
49
self-defense are more closely associated with jus ad bellum
50
(sometimes referred to as the “Just War theory”). Jus ad bellum refers
to a set of moral and legal principles developed over centuries to
address the question of whether a nation’s initiation of a war is

46. Id. at 632. At trial, the prosecution had alleged that the defendant could not
have plausibly perceived herself to be in imminent danger and that a rational woman
in her situation would have contacted the police or left her abusive husband. Id. at
633-34. On appeal, however, the court noted that expert testimony would provide
background information that the jury could use to determine whether the defendant
indeed perceived that there was a threat to her life. Id. The court also accepted the
suggestion that expert testimony might give weight to the defendant’s claim of being
unable to escape the relationship, on grounds attributable to her state of mind. Id.
at 634-35.
47. Id. at 632, 640 (remanding the case to the trial court and explaining that the
question of admissibility of expert testimony, whether about BWS or otherwise, was
governed by case law focusing on the witness’ expertise and was at the discretion of
the trial court).
48. See Parrish, supra note 32, at 83 (summarizing the results of a 1995 study,
which showed that “[e]xpert testimony on battering and its effects [was] admissible,
at least to some degree” in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and in most of the
federal courts that had considered this issue). It must be acknowledged, however,
that BWS has many skeptics, ranging from those who believe that it has no scientific
basis to those who do not approve of its use in self-defense cases. See, e.g., David L.
Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 67, 70 (1997) (criticizing BWS as “pseudoscientific” and asserting that it “has no
basis in science and has received its main support from the politics it was believed to
advance”).
49. In this Comment, the term “national self-defense” refers to defensive actions
of states against other nations or non-state actors that project force, usually in the
form of a military attack. This term does not refer to the legal doctrine of selfdefense under international law, but rather to states’ actual practices.
50. See Frédéric Mégret, Justice in Times of Violence, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 327, 339 n.25
(2003) (explaining that while the primary intent of jus ad bellum was to define when
the use of force by a state is legitimate, the issues of national self-defense and
collective security are byproducts of this theory); cf. BRIAN OREND, MICHAEL WALZER
ON WAR AND JUSTICE 87 (McGill-Queen’s Univ. Press 2000) (noting that many of the
concepts derived from the Just War theory, including jus ad bellum principles, have
since been incorporated into international laws governing armed conflict).
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51

justified. One of the elements of jus ad bellum is that a nation must
have a “just cause” for launching a war; otherwise it is an unjust
52
aggressor. Commonly mentioned just causes include self-defense
from an external attack, recovery of property, and punishment for an
53
unjust act.
While jus ad bellum influenced the formulation of national self54
defense principles, nations’ actual behavior was unchecked due to
an absence of laws regulating state conduct both before and during
55
war. Similar to the actions of a criminal defendant, the use of force

51. See Mégret, supra note 50, at 339 (observing that jus ad bellum was a “device for
order,” which came out of attempts, over many centuries, to control the use of
violence by one state against another). Although jus ad bellum has its origins in
canonic law and draws from religious sources, including biblical texts and the
writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the scholars most often associated with it are
Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), and Emmerich de
Vattel (1714-1767). OREND, supra note 50, at 86-87.
52. See OREND, supra note 50, at 87 (listing “just cause” as one of several
requirements that a state must fulfill in order for its decision to launch a war to be
justified); cf. MICHAEL WALZER, The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of
Success), in ARGUING ABOUT WAR 3, 18 (2004) (positioning a “war of aggression” as the
opposite of a just war meaning that the aggressor state violates the status quo
between nations and should be responsible for restoring the status quo when it is
justly defeated).
53. See OREND, supra note 50, at 87 (explaining that various classic writings on the
Just War tradition usually cited the following causes as legitimate justifications for
going to war: “self-defence from external attack; the protection of innocents; and
punishment for wrongdoing”); see also HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE
(DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS) 72 (Louise R. Loomis trans., Walter J. Black 1949) (1625)
(summarizing the three most common just causes of war as “defense, recovery of
property, and punishment”). Grotius, generally viewed as one of the most
prominent contributors to the Just War theory, recognized that self-defense is a just
cause for war by stating “it is lawful to kill a person preparing to kill another,” and by
further clarifying that the principles regarding the “right of defending one’s
person . . . should likewise be applied to public war.” Id. at 74-76. Vattel likewise
declared that “[a] nation has a right to resist an injurious attempt” and to use force
against the aggressor. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 241 (Luke White
1792). A nation may even “anticipate its [enemy’s] machinations,” but it must be
careful “not to attack [the enemy] upon vague and uncertain suspicions, in order to
avoid exposing itself to become an unjust aggressor.” Id.
54. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
55. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 160 (3d ed. 2001).
[W]hen the freedom to wage war was countenanced without reservation (in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), concern with the issue of selfdefence was largely a metajuridical exercise. As long as recourse to war was
considered free for all, against all, for any reason on earth—including
territorial expansion or even motives of prestige and grandeur—States did
not need a legal justification to commence hostilities.
The author further noted that through the nineteenth century, a state’s right to
initiate war at will was considered legitimate under international law and even an
attribute of national sovereignty. Id. at 71. Ian Brownlie, another eminent legal
scholar, commented that “[t]he [nineteenth] century was still dominated by an
unrestricted right of war and the recognition of conquests, qualified by the political
system of the European Concert.” IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE BY STATES 19 (1963).
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by a State claiming self-defense can be best analyzed after the
56
incident in question. However, until the middle of the twentieth
century, there was no legal body that could realistically claim to have
57
jurisdiction over such actions.
The consequent dearth of legal
precedent and the lack of codified standards for self-defense in
international law (especially before the emergence of the United
Nations) mean that the exact bounds of states’ rights to self-defense
have to be deduced from various treaties and international conflicts.
The modern right of anticipatory self-defense has its roots in the
58
so-called Caroline incident. In 1837, in response to the use of the
steamship Caroline by Canadian rebels, a British-led paramilitary
force crossed into the United States, set the Caroline on fire, and
59
forced it down Niagara Falls.
British officials claimed they were
acting in self-defense, but U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster
rejected their position by enunciating limits on a nation’s right to
60
self-defense. The reason that the Caroline case is seminal in the
61
development of a legal framework for anticipatory self-defense is
that it suggested that the use of force in self-defense was limited to
only those actions where: (1) the use of force was necessary due to
lack of alternatives; and (2) the magnitude of force used was
62
proportionate to the force that provoked it.
This was a novel
56. See The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 100 (1947) (“[W]hether action taken
under the claim of self-defense was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be
subject to investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced.”),
quoted in Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the
Development of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 493, 505 (1990).
57. See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 106-07 (noting that several non-binding
international instruments articulated the criminality of aggressive war, but the
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal created in the aftermath of World War II
was the first body with the power and ability to judge claims of aggressive war).
58. See D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1958) (referring
to the Caroline incident as the “locus classicus of the right of self-defence”, quoted in
Yoo, supra note 18, at 741 n.41); Yoo, supra note 18, at 740 (“The classic formulation
of the right of anticipatory self-defense arose from the Caroline incident.”).
59. Rogoff & Collins, supra note 56, at 493-95. Caroline was a privately owned
American steamboat that ferried supplies to Upper Canada (now Ontario) to
support a small band of Canadian rebels after their bid for independence from
British rule had failed. Id. at 493-95. A sortie of Canadian loyalist militia and the
Royal Navy seized the ship while it was in United States territory, set it on fire and
cast it adrift over Niagara Falls, killing two Americans. Id. at 495.
60. See infra note 62 (explaining Webster’s assertions).
61. See Rogoff & Collins, supra note 56, at 498 (stating that the Caroline doctrine
“effectively defined the limits of self-defense, and in so doing enabled later statesmen
and scholars to distinguish that concept [from] self-preservation”); see also Binding the
Colossus, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that the Caroline incident was the “classic
formulation of the right of pre-emptive attack”).
62. Rogoff & Collins, supra note 56, at 498. In an exchange of diplomatic
correspondence with the British government, which had claimed that its subjects in
Canada were acting in self-defense, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster countered
that the self-defense claim would stand only if the British could show a “necessity of
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proposition at a time when a nation’s right to wage war was
63
unchallenged in the system of international relations.
Although the Caroline criteria were never codified, they have been
64
generally respected as customary international law. For instance,
the Nuremberg Tribunal, which prosecuted German officials for war
65
crimes after World War II, utilized the Caroline formulation of selfdefense in rejecting Germany’s claim that it invaded Norway in order
66
to prevent an imminent Allied attack. In holding that Germany
invaded Norway for strategic reasons and that the invasion thus failed
to meet the Caroline requirements of necessity and proportionality of
force, the Tribunal implicitly affirmed the legal validity of the Caroline
67
doctrine.
By the early twentieth century there was no question that nations
68
had a basic right to self-defense, but even in light of the Caroline
69
doctrine, laws governing national self-defense were vague.
self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation.” Id. at 497-98 (quoting British government documents). Webster
further noted that “the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited
by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.” Id. at 498.
63. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (commenting on the historical
absence of laws governing the initiation of war).
64. See BROWNLIE, supra note 55, at 257 (mentioning the Caroline doctrine in the
context of the right of anticipatory self-defense in customary international law).
65. See The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 76 (1947) (establishing the Nuremberg
Tribunal’s jurisdiction over individuals charged with crimes against peace, including
planning and waging of wars of aggression; war crimes; and crimes against
humanity).
66. See id. at 99 (citing the Caroline case and quoting Webster’s own words, as
described supra note 62, in the analysis of Germany’s claim of having acted in selfdefense).
67. See id. at 99-100 (reviewing German military memoranda that presented
various grounds for invading Norway and concluding that “[f]rom all this it is clear
that when the plans for an attack on Norway were being made, they were not made
for the purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing,” but rather to set up
military bases for a future attack on England and France).
68. National self-defense was such an intrinsically understood part of statehood,
that:
[D]uring the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928
[renouncing war as an instrument of foreign policy], [U.S.] Secretary of
State Kellogg observed that there was no need to state it expressly in the
terms of the Pact; even the adoption of texts that seem inconsistent with
exercise of the right, he said, do not preclude reliance upon it.
Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51
of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 558 n.62 (2001) (citing
Telegram from Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State, to the Ambassador in France
(Apr. 23, 1928), 1 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 34, 36-37 (1928)).
69. Because international self-defense laws were not codified, the principles
governing self-defense could be interpreted differently by various countries and in
divergent legal traditions. See Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 872, 877 (1947)
(observing that it is common “that all states, determined to go to war, plead selfdefense,” and that nations have used self-defense to justify such diverse causes as the
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Governments hesitated to formally define the bounds of national selfdefense because an overly narrow definition would possibly preclude
nations from relying on this right, while a broader definition would
make it easier for a nation to claim self-defense as a justification for
70
an unwarranted attack.
In 1945, the United Nations was formed with the aim of preventing
71
future wars and promoting the use of international law.
The
Charter of the United Nations (“U.N. Charter”) prohibited the
72
“threat or use of force” against any other State, and idealistically
directed all United Nations members to “settle their international
73
disputes by peaceful means.”
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
attempted to provide definitive guidance for member States’ right to
self-defense by declaring: “[n]othing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
74
international peace and security.” However, due to its vagueness
and political and practical considerations, Article 51 has had a
destabilizing effect on the viability of customary international law of
self-defense, as further explored in the following section.

Monroe Doctrine, the “vital interests” doctrine, the lend-lease program, and others)
(citations omitted).
70. As the American side noted in its draft of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, “it is
not in the interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of selfdefense, since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an
agreed definition.” M.A. Weightman, Self-Defense in International Law, 37 VA. L. REV.
1095, 1106 n.32 (1951). The British also objected to codifying the limits on national
self-defense, noting that the circumstances of a given case may warrant self-defense
actions that would have been improper under other circumstances. Id.
71. See U.N. Charter pmbl. (recognizing the devastation brought on by World
Wars I and II and stating that the United Nations aimed to “establish conditions”
under which nations will respect and adhere to international law, and asserting as
one of its goals the elimination of use of force except to further the “common
interest[s]” of member states).
72. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
73. Id. art. 2, para. 3.
74. Id. art. 51 (emphasis added). Article 51 goes on to define the Security
Council’s role when a member state acts in self-defense under this Article:
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Id.
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE CLAIMS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE PRISM OF
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Many commentaries that have attempted to analyze the legitimacy
of the United States’ invasion of Iraq have done so within the
75
framework of the U.N. Charter or the Caroline criteria. This Part of
the Comment attempts to show why existing international law, as
exemplified by the Caroline Doctrine and Article 51, cannot
adequately address various factors inherent to contemporary
international conflicts. A subsequent examination of the parallels
between States that initiate preemptive strikes and battered women
who attack their abusers suggests that the question of imminence in
both scenarios should address other factors in addition to the
temporal proximity of harm.
A. The Limitations of Existing International Law for Addressing States’
Rights to Anticipatory Self-Defense
As a result of rapid advances in military technology and the
changing nature of international conflicts, the existing legal
framework based on the Caroline criteria and the U.N. Charter is no
76
longer viable for nations under threat. In the past, warfare was
75. E.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., Preemption and Law in the Twenty-First Century, 5
CHI. J. INT’L L. 467, 467-70 (2005) (arguing that the United States’ attack on Iraq and
ouster of Saddam Hussein were a legitimate exercise of anticipatory self-defense
supported by the U.N. Charter and the Caroline principles, which are enshrined in
customary international law); see, e.g., Glennon, supra note 68, at 540-41, 546-47
(analyzing the legality of anticipatory self-defense under Article 51 and conceding
that it would probably not be permitted under a plain language interpretation of the
Article, but asserting that this only brings to light the U.N. Charter’s shortcomings);
John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 571-74 (2003)
(asserting that a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions, laws governing
armistices, Article 51, and principles of customary international law established
sufficient legal authority for the American attack on Iraq). But see Ferzan, supra note
9, at 215-19 (distinguishing the moral foundations of the right to self-defense from
the related concept of necessity of action and asserting that the United States’ attack
on Iraq did not meet the imminence requirements of self-defense, regardless of the
underlying legal framework); Yoo, supra note 18, at 730 (rejecting the use of the U.N.
Charter to assess the United States’ justification of its use of force in Iraq and
proposing a cost-benefit analysis to address similar concerns in the future).
76. See Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory SelfDefense, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24, 26 (detailing several reasons why
“[t]wenty-first century security needs are different from those imagined in San
Francisco [during the drafting of the U.N. Charter] in 1945”). Glennon’s examples
include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which make it possible for
the initial attack to be decisive, and the existence of “terrorist organizations ‘of
global reach,’” that often enjoy state support. Id. See also Beth M. Polebaum, Note,
National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 202-03 (1984) (asserting that developments in military technology
have rendered the U.N. Charter’s restrictive view of nations’ defensive needs
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typically exemplified by the physical movement of military forces and
77
However, the
by a clear knowledge of the parties to a conflict.
proliferation of international terrorism, combined with greater
accessibility to weapons of mass destruction, drastically changes the
78
dynamic of international conflicts. These types of threats require
new types of responses, and States must have the ability to resort to a
wider variety of options—not only diplomatic and military, but also
79
legal.
The Caroline criteria cannot be effective in light of the destructive
80
capacity of modern weapons and methods of war. Nuclear weapons
are capable of sudden destruction on a scale unlike that of any
conventional weapons, which may prevent the attacked nation from
mounting an effective response, especially if a nuclear attack is
81
followed by one with conventional military means. In 1981, during a
obsolete).
77. See WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 15 (2002) [hereinafter NSS], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/n
ss.pdf (noting that in the past, imminent threats usually took the form of “visible
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack”); see also Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 2-3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (recognizing only two types of armed conflict: a
“declared war or . . . any other armed conflict” between two or more signatories to
the Convention, and an “armed conflict not of an international character” in the
territory of one of the signatories).
78. See Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Nat’l Sec. Advisor, Remarks as the Wriston
Lecturer at the Manhattan Institute (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://www.whitehous
e.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html (explaining the rationale behind
the National Security Strategy (NSS) by noting that the threats of terrorist networks
and rogue regimes “magnif[y] the danger of the other,” because they can pass
weapons, technology, and other assets or abilities to each other, and thus increase
the scope and scale of potential destruction); see also Nye, supra note 8, at A27
(explaining that a major recent shift in world politics is the “privatization of war,”
whereby regimes such as those under Hitler or Stalin could only kill millions of
people using the full resources of government, but in the twenty-first century,
terrorists need little more than access to weapons of mass destruction to cause death
and destruction on a similar scale).
79. See Rice, supra note 78 (explaining that the catastrophic potential of some
threats, namely those related to weapons of mass destruction, “requires new thinking
about when a threat actually becomes ‘imminent’” as a matter of common sense, but
that this new thinking, as embodied in the NSS, “does not overturn five decades of
doctrine and jettison either containment or deterrence”).
80. See Yoo, supra note 18, at 750 (noting that the Caroline approach came about
“in the age of sailing ships and the Concert of Europe,” thus in light of weapons of
mass destruction, the reduced response time to potential threats, and the reduced
effectiveness of nonviolent measures, Caroline is not likely to be heeded by actors that
eschew international controls, and would in turn likely be ignored by states facing a
potential threat); see also infra note 125 (describing the potential destructive
capabilities of modern weaponry and terrorist methods of attack).
81. See Polebaum, supra note 76, at 228 (noting that in a case involving a nuclear
threat, there may be a “swift progression from threat to deployment to annihilation,”
which would make the traditional legal standards of self-defense outdated); see also
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
243 (July 8) (analyzing the characteristics of nuclear weapons and noting that their
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United Nations debate in which Israel articulated its justification for
82
destroying the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq, the Israeli
Ambassador explained some of the shortcomings of the Caroline
principles:
To try and apply [the Caroline doctrine] to a nuclear situation in
the post-Hiroshima era makes clear the absurdity of the position of
those who base themselves upon it. To assert the applicability of
the Caroline principles to a State confronted with the threat of
nuclear destruction would be an emasculation of that State’s
83
inherent and natural right of self-defence.

The United Nations’ lack of assertive action in response to the
Israeli attack suggested that the international community was willing
to tolerate Israel’s rationalization of the attack, thereby undermining
84
the significance of Caroline in evaluating self-defense claims.
Applying a strict reading of Article 51 to an anticipatory selfdefense claim would also be a mistake. The effect of the language of
Article 51 on principles governing self-defense has been exactly what

potential for radiation and destructive power, which “cannot be contained in either
space or time,” make these weapons “potentially catastrophic”). For example,
approximately 100,000 people died as a result of the American fire-bombing of
Tokyo in March, 1945 and over 100,000 civilians died as a result of a nuclear strike
on Hiroshima in August 1945: “One plane, one bomb . . . . Atomic war was death
indeed, indiscriminate and total[.]” MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A
MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 266, 269 (1977); see also UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY: SUMMARY REPORT (PACIFIC WAR) 22 (1946) id. at
24 (calculating that “the damage and casualties caused at Hiroshima by the one
atomic bomb dropped from a single plane would have required 220 B-29s carrying
1,200 tons of incendiary bombs, 400 tons of high-explosive bombs, and 500 tons of
anti-personnel fragmentation bombs, if conventional weapons, rather than an atomic
bomb, had been used”). On September 11, 2001, almost three thousand people
were killed at the World Trade Center alone, in an attack which did not utilize nonconventional weapons, but rather non-conventional military methods. See JOHN
KEEGAN, THE IRAQ WAR 89-90 (Alfred A. Knopf 2004). These examples illustrate the
scope of death and destruction likely to occur as a result of a single strategically
calculated attack.
82. See infra note 113 for a factual background of the Israeli attack.
83. Rogoff & Collins, supra note 56, at 509.
84. See Anthony D’Amato, Israel’s Air Strike against the Osiraq Reactor: A
Retrospective, 10 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 259, 262 (1996) (noting that the Security
Council unanimously voted to condemn the Israeli action, but significantly, the
resulting resolution was completely ineffective in that it did not propose any
punishment and basically amounted to “a gentle pat on the wrist”); Double Standards,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2002, at 22, 24 (explaining that Security Council Resolution
487, passed under Chapter Six in response to the Israeli attack on Osiraq, was a “nonbinding recommendation[]” that did no more than “scold[] Israel” by merely calling
upon it to refrain from such acts in the future); Rivkin, supra note 75, at 480
(asserting that “international inaction strongly suggest[ed] a fundamental
recognition that Israel acted in accordance with her rights under international law”);
D’Amato, supra, at 259 (“These . . . speculations make it clear that Israel did the
world a great service on June 7, 1981, in its air strike against the Osiraq nuclear
reactor.”).

SKOPETS.OFFTOPRINTER

772

2/23/2006 3:43:15 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:753

the drafters of early international treaties concerning the use of force
85
feared: confusion. Article 51 does not specify any criteria for the
use of force in self-defense other than in response to an armed
86
attack.
However, even in the case of an armed attack, some
defensive actions, such as a nuclear response to a conventional
87
military attack, would likely be judged as unjustified. By preserving
States’ “inherent right” of self-defense, Article 51 effectively
incorporates the necessity and proportionality principles of the
Caroline doctrine, seeing that they formed the basis of customary
international self-defense law prior to the adoption of the U.N.
88
Charter. But because the Caroline doctrine was not a well-delineated
formulation, it provided a certain amount of latitude for acting
preemptively, so long as the use of force met Caroline’s main

85. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining why British and
American governments did not want to codify limits on the use of force in selfdefense); see also Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 661, 678 (noting the inconsistency between
the broader customary right to self-defense and the self-defense rights envisaged in
Article 51, and concluding that this inconsistency has “prevented the narrow reading
of the right of self-defence laid down in Art. 51 from becoming established in
customary international law”). The author further claims that Article 51 “supercedes
and replaces the traditional right to self-defence” of U.N. member-states.
Randelzhofer, supra note 4, at 661, 678.
86. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (quoting the full text of Article 51,
which neither defines “armed attack,” nor provides guidance or limitations on the
“right of self defence”).
87. See WALZER, supra note 81, at 274-83 (analyzing a number of arguments for
and against the use of nuclear weapons in various circumstances and concluding that
the use of nuclear weapons is never legitimate under “just war” principles). In a 1996
advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under international
law, the International Court of Justice concluded that: “the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
266 (July 8). The Court did add, however that:
[I]n view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact
at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake.
Id.
88. See Glennon, supra note 68, at 553 (interpreting the words “nothing . . . shall
impair [the inherent right of self-defense]” in Article 51 as an indication that such a
right was acceptable prior to the U.N. Charter and “continues to exist . . . after [its]
ratification”); cf. Rogoff & Collins, supra note 56, at 509 (discussing a United Nations
Security Council debate in 1981 where several delegates relied on the Caroline
doctrine’s requirements of necessity and proportionality to condemn Israel’s military
actions); supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing the Nuremberg
Tribunal’s use of the Caroline doctrine to determine the invalidity of Germany’s selfdefense claims). But see supra note 85 (arguing that restrictions on independent state
actions incorporated into Article 51 supercede customary international law of selfdefense).
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89

conditions of necessity and proportionality.
Hence, the Article’s
requirement that an armed attack take place for self-defense to be
warranted contravenes a State’s inherent right—also incorporated
90
into the Article—to preempt such an attack under Caroline.
Article 51 gives rise to another ambiguity by recognizing a nation’s
self-defense actions as legitimate only until the Security Council steps
91
in. This provision of Article 51 interferes with nations’ customary
self-defense rights (which do not provide for deference to any
international bodies), thereby further infringing on the same
“inherent right” of self-defense that Article 51 purports not to
92
impair.
As a result of these inconsistencies, the U.N. Security Council’s role
in self-defense actions has been “almost devoid of practical
93
significance,” and nations have at times invoked Article 51 to
94
In addition to the
rationalize actions unrelated to self-defense.
89. See The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 99 (1947) (stating explicitly that
“preventive action in foreign territory is justified” if the Caroline criteria are satisfied).
The facts of the Caroline incident support this view, since Webster’s objections to
British claims of preemptive self-defense did not call into question the validity of
their assertions, but rather only defined the limits of legitimate self-defense. Supra
note 62; cf. Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1475, 1476-77 (asserting that force employed in self-defense is always
preemptive, whether in a personal confrontation or in a military one, “[b]ecause no
one can ever be absolutely certain what will happen if he does not employ
preemptive defensive force [and] must [thus] act on an assessment of
probabilities”).
90. See Glennon, supra note 68, at 553 (asserting that, by adding the explicit
requirement that an armed attack occur, Article 51 effectively removes “a state’s
inherent right to preempt that attack”); supra note 89 and accompanying text
(showing that a state has a right to act preemptively in self-defense under Caroline).
91. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (permitting a nation to act in self-defense “until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security,” indicating that the Security Council’s authority takes precedence over a
member state’s right to self-defense).
92. See Glennon, supra note 68, at 553-54 (explaining that the text of Article 51
impairs a state’s right to self-defense by giving the Security Council primary and
superceding authority to act); see also Randelzhofer, supra note 85, at 676-77
(explaining that this restriction on a nation’s right to self-defense, together with a
nation’s obligation under Article 51 to report to the Security Council any measures
taken in self-defense, “are evidence of the fact that the right of self-defence
embodied in Art. 51 is only meant to be of a subsidiary nature”).
93. See Randelzhofer, supra note 85, at 676-77 (analyzing Article 51’s limits on the
customary right to self-defense and observing that, because the Security Council has
long “been far from performing its intended function” of taking “the measures
necessary” to maintain “peace and security,” the restrictions on the actions of states
embodied in Article 51 have lost any practical meaning); cf. Ruth Lapidoth, The
Security Council in the May 1967 Crisis: A Study in Frustration, 4 ISR. L. REV. 534, 548-49
(1969) (providing a detailed recount of the on-the-ground events and diplomatic
maneuvers leading up to the Six Day War and concluding that the Security Council’s
failure to act effectively to prevent war was “but a symptom of its decline and
inability” resulting from political bias and lack of cooperation between members).
94. See Binding the Colossus, supra note 7, at 25-26 (referring to various states’ use
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deficiencies of Article 51, using the Caroline doctrine could
potentially be a problem in its own right, because, as explained
above, its principles are not well suited to contemporary military and
95
political realities.
The various shortcomings of the Caroline
principles, of Article 51, and of the amalgamation of the two make it
clear that existing international law of self-defense is neither flexible
nor lucid enough for nations to be able to rely on it in moments of
crisis.
B. Parallels Between Battered Women Claiming Self-Defense After Killing
Their Abusers and Nations Relying on Their Anticipatory Self-Defense Rights
to Justify a Preemptive Attack
This Comment proposes that it is appropriate to evaluate a nation’s
anticipatory self-defense claim by accepting a broad view of the
imminence requirement, analogous to how courts treat battered
women’s self-defense claims. There are relative similarities between
women who rely on BWS in their self-defense claims and nations that
claim a right to anticipatory self-defense in justifying preemptive
96
strikes. Consequently, one must give careful consideration to any
germane evidence that could possibly justify a preemptive action
which would otherwise be illegal under an application of traditional
self-defense principles.

of Article 51 as “creative re-interpretation,” because it has been used to justify actions
as wide ranging as humanitarian missions, actions to retrieve citizens from danger
spots, and retaliatory actions against terrorist groups); see also Randelzhofer, supra
note 85, at 677 (noting that in the face of the Security Council’s inaction in most
incidents involving self-defense, “self-defence has become the regular course of
action”); id. at 678 (“Since 1945, various states, occasionally with the approval of
others, have invoked a wide concept of self-defence under customary law allegedly
not restricted by Art. 51, and have carried out actions involving the use of force
which were not directed against armed attacks.”).
95. See supra notes 80 & 83 and accompanying text (highlighting the deficiencies
of the Caroline principles in light of the changes that have taken place in the realm of
international conflicts since 1837). But see note 89 and accompanying text (arguing
that the Caroline principles create enough latitude to permit the use of preemptive
self-defense).
96. See Ferzan, supra note 9, at 216 (observing that the common rationale
underlying the Bush Administration’s arguments and the claims of battered women
is that harm was inevitable and “the imminence requirement is ill-equipped to
mediate the[] situation[],” leading one to ask “why . . . wait until it is imminent?”);
Yoo, supra note 18, at 753-54 (illustrating that both battered women and nations
claiming self-defense may seek to use evidence of past violence to buttress their
claims that it was necessary to act preemptively).
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1.

Perception of imminence
A defensive action, whether by a battered woman or by a nation,
97
results from a perception of the imminence of coming harm. In the
time leading up to the killing of her abusive spouse, a battered
woman has a heightened sense of danger but she does not necessarily
98
wish to murder her spouse. Accordingly, the catalyst that impels a
battered woman to confront her aggressor is usually an abusive
99
episode or a threat of abuse.
In Ibn-Tamas, for example, the
defendant’s husband tried to kick her out of the house by repeatedly
100
When he later
hitting and threatening her with a handgun.
resumed attacking her, she thought he was reaching for the gun so
101
she picked it up and fired it. Although the defendant had tried to
avoid her husband after being physically assaulted, she shot him
102
when he came back because she thought he was about to shoot her.
Similarly, a nation acting in anticipatory self-defense is likely
103
responding to an act that establishes a military threat. Similar to a
97. See Walker, supra note 31, at 324 (observing that a battered woman’s
reasonable perception of imminent danger drives her to take preemptive action
before the abuser has an opportunity to inflict significant physical harm, and is thus
a critical component of her self-defense claim); Glennon, supra note 68, at 552-53
(suggesting that both common sense and responsibility for the well-being of a
nation’s citizens would force policymakers to take preemptive action in response to
another state’s posturing that indicated that aggression was imminent).
98. Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered Women as Defendants, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 233, 237, 244 (N. Zoe Hilton ed.,
1993) (asserting that “[f]ew battered women actually premeditate their assaulter’s
death” even though “battered women live their life always having an underlying fear
of the man’s violent potential”); see BROWNE, supra note 32, at 135 (observing that
battered women’s killing of their abusers are usually unplanned).
99. See BROWNE, supra note 32, at 135 (claiming that battered women kill their
husbands as a result of frequent and severe violence as well as a perception of the
inevitability of death based on specific, escalating threats by the abuser); Walker,
supra note 98, at 242-43 (providing an example of a woman shooting her abuser after
he initiated an argument with her, got angrier, and pushed her, because the battered
woman could perceive certain cues in the man’s behavior, especially if this situation
was similar to one she had already experienced and conveyed to her a reasonable
perception of danger); see also Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 950 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (summarizing the basic premise of using BWS to support a battered
woman’s self-defense claim and noting that battered women “may be driven to take
the lives of their mates as the only possible method of escaping the threat”), denying
cert. to State v. Moran, 1983 WL 2712 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1983); see, e.g., IbnTamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979) (observing that the expert
witness’ testimony could support defendant’s claim that she perceived herself to be
in imminent danger, as characterized by her words “I just knew he was going to kill
me,” and no less importantly could explain to the jury why the prosecution’s position
that the defendant “could have gotten out” of the relationship by leaving her
husband or by calling the police was not a feasible option for a woman in her
situation).
100. Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 630.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 173 (describing that Israel’s assessment
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battered woman, a nation that claims anticipatory self-defense has
foreknowledge of a threat facing it, which may be unavoidable unless
104
the nation takes action. A nation therefore uses this knowledge as
105
the basis for its decision to strike first.
As an example of this, in
1967, Israel attacked Egypt in response to a perceived threat of attack,
thus initiating the Six Day War. Egypt had ordered the withdrawal of
the United Nations Emergency Forces from the Egyptian-Israeli
border, it had closed the Straits of Tiran, massed its troops along
Israeli borders, and its President had made incendiary declarations
106
calling for the destruction of Israel.
Israel held off after initial
Egyptian provocations, but was compelled to attack after Egypt
publicly reasserted that it wanted to destroy Israel and signed military
107
treaties to that effect with Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. Believing Egypt
posed an imminent threat, Israel responded with a preemptive
108
defensive action.
Admittedly, there is a clear facial difference in how a battered
woman and a threatened nation perceive the imminence of harm—
the former bases it on her experiences and knowledge of the
109
attacker, whereas the latter relies on its intelligence capabilities and
110
on the history of the attacking nation’s past actions. However, this
“in the aggregate” of Egypt’s provocative actions created a perception that Egypt was
about to deliver a “shattering blow” and led to Israel’s decision to preemptively
attack).
104. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 6 (basing the case for military action against Iraq on
multiple examples of evidence showing that Iraq had the capacity to produce large
amounts of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and claiming that Iraq’s links
to Al Qaeda made Iraq a threat to the United States and to international security);
Glennon, supra note 76, at 26 (claiming that the United States’ attack on Afghanistan
was aimed to prevent a concrete threat of future attacks).
105. See supra note 104 (suggesting that the United States acted preemptively in
Iraq and Afghanistan, based on intelligence of future threats emanating from those
countries).
106. See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 173 (describing the events that lead up to
Israel’s preemptive attack on Egyptian forces in 1967 and concluding that the
combination of these factors “qualified as an armed attack” to justify self-defense).
107. See WALZER, supra note 81, at 83-84 (describing Israel’s efforts to defuse the
crisis through diplomatic means and its consequent decision to strike).
108. See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 173 (observing that, because of Egypt’s actions,
“it seemed to be crystal clear that Egypt was bent on an armed attack,” and noting that
this perception was shared by other nations “based on sound judgment of events”)
(emphasis added).
109. See Walker, supra note 31, at 326 (suggesting that most battered women know
their abusers well enough to be able to perceive a forthcoming threat from a “certain
look in his eyes, a certain litany of words, [or] a certain pattern of pushes, shoves,
and slaps”); Walker, supra note 98, at 242 (claiming that most women who are victims
of repeated assault “recognize danger more quickly and accurately than do others”).
110. See, e.g., supra note 104 (describing the intelligence that convinced the U.S.
government to decide to attack Iraq and Afghanistan); Bush, supra note 6 (citing
Saddam Hussein’s regime’s “history of reckless aggression” and past violations of
Security Council resolutions as evidence of Iraq’s threat to the United States and
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is not a fundamental incongruence but one predicated on the
difference between international and family relations. A nation’s
intelligence service is like a battered woman’s experiential knowledge
in that it analyzes data about a subject and produces a prediction
111
based on its subsequent intimate familiarity with that subject.
A
battered woman does not kill her attacker purely in response to a
threat; she evaluates the threat through the lens of the battering
112
relationship and concludes that she is facing imminent harm.
Likewise, a nation does not attack preemptively solely in response to a
provocation; the preemptive response is based on a multitude of
113
intelligence indicating an overwhelming likelihood of future harm.

other countries); WALZER, supra note 81, at 82-84 (analyzing Egyptian actions in the
1950s and 60s that contributed to the Israeli perception of the inevitability of an
Egyptian attack in 1967). In the case of the Israeli attack, first, Egypt maintained its
1948 posture that Israel did not have a right to exist as a state. Id. at 82. Second, the
Suez War of 1956, brought on by Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, led to an
international recognition of the Straits of Tiran as an international waterway, so
Israel could construe Egyptian declarations prohibiting Israel from using the Straits
as a declaration of war. Id. at 83. Third, in May of 1967, Egypt continued to make
anti-Israeli proclamations. Id. at 83-84. All this contributed to the Israeli belief that a
preemptive strike was necessary in order not to fall victim to Egyptian aggression. Id.
at 83-84.
111. See RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM
IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 99-100 (2005) (describing an intelligence organization as
consisting of “collection, analysis, and action” components, which first gather both
publicly available and secret information about the target, and then analyze and
interpret this information, leading to some action based on what the intelligence
reveals); see also NSS, supra note 77, at 30 (stating that “integrated threat assessments
for national and homeland security” are based on American intelligence warning
and analysis capabilities); Glennon, supra note 76, at 26 (stating that the U.S.
government gleaned evidence of the threat of future attacks from “multiple
intelligence sources”); supra notes 109 & 110 (containing examples of other factors
upon which battered women and nations base predictions of their aggressors’ future
behavior).
112. See supra notes 99 & 109 and accompanying text (discussing how battered
women develop their perceptions of imminent harm through past experiences with
the abuser, and how based on that knowledge and a litany of cues, they interpret
abusers’ behavior differently than would others).
113. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 76, at 26 (suggesting that the United States’
invasion of Afghanistan was not initiated as a reprisal for the events of September 11,
2001, but rather as a response to additional intelligence that Taliban and Al Qaida
posed a further threat to the United States). Another example is Israel’s attack on
the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq in 1981, where Iraq claimed that it wanted the
reactor for “peaceful” purposes, but Israeli intelligence indicated that Iraq planned
to use the nuclear facility to produce weapons-grade plutonium to develop nuclear
weapons. William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural Law Justification
for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1410-11 (2004).
Hence, the Israeli decision to destroy the reactor was not a reaction to a vague threat
but to the high probability of Iraq using nuclear force against Israel in the near
future. Id. at 1411. In retrospect, Israel’s act is usually recognized as a justified
preventive attack against the Iraqi threat. MICHAEL WALZER, Five on Iraq: Inspectors
Yes, War No, in ARGUING ABOUT WAR, supra note 52, at 143, 147.
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2.

Repercussions of aggressor’s action
The role of a belligerent nation in an international conflict is akin
to that of the batterer in an abusive relationship. In general, when
one person purposely attacks another and succeeds in the deed,
whether because the victim does not put up resistance or the
resistance is ineffectual, the aggressor’s action is either a battery or a
114
homicide. The physical effects of the aggressor’s action are isolated
115
to the specific incident.
This is not the case in the context of an
abusive relationship, where in addition to physically harming the
woman, the aggressor causes her long-term harm by perpetuating the
116
battered woman’s status as a victim within the relationship and
117
undermining her psychological stability. Likewise, when a nation is
allowed to threaten and attack another without impediment, it gains
in some tangible aspects, but its intangible gains may be even greater.
118
The victor nation may obtain tangible benefits like territory or
119
120
and it may also acquire greater political clout.
resources,
114. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004) (providing the criminal law
definition of battery as “[t]he use of force against another, resulting in harmful or
offensive contact”); id. at 751 (defining criminal homicide as “[t]he act of purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causing the death of another human being”)
(citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1).
115. Although a battery or homicide of an individual may affect others, the victim
is the only one who suffers physical harm as a result of the act.
116. See WALKER, supra note 39, at 50-51 (explaining “learned helplessness” as the
process through which, as a result of repetitive instances of abuse, a woman resorts to
coping mechanisms which lead to results she can foresee (including further abuse),
rather than trying to escape the relationship or the specific situation, because this act
may have unpredictable consequences); CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN
WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 66-67 (1987)
(“‘[Learned] helplessness’ is a psychological state which develops when, as a result of
being repeatedly exposed to outcomes beyond one’s control, one ‘learns’ that
nothing one does will affect or alter any outcome.”).
117. See EWING, supra note 116, at 67 (summarizing Lenore Walker’s studies of
battered women and explaining that battered women are psychologically unable to
escape the abusive relationship because learned helplessness “diminishes [the
battered woman’s] motivation” and leads her to think that she has no ability to
prevent being abused, “ultimately [causing her] to believe that nothing she does will
be of any avail”).
118. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 81, at 52 (citing Germany’s seizures of
Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1939 as prime examples of territorial conquests by a
nation whose aggression was not resisted by the victim states); Eritrea v. Ethiopia: Oh
No, Not Again, ECONOMIST, Apr. 5, 2003, at 44 (describing the war between Ethiopia
and Eritrea over the village of Badme, population five thousand, fought because
neither side was willing to accede to the other’s territorial claims); cf. Yoo, supra note
18, at 748 (observing that World Wars I and II were fought for territorial gain, but
this is no longer the primary objective of warfare in the post-World War II period).
119. See, e.g., KEEGAN, supra note 81, at 74-76 (describing Iraq’s occupation of
Kuwait in 1990 as ostensibly targeting “only the disputed Rumeila oil field and the
oil-bearing islands of Warba and Bubiyan,” but noting that as a result of the Iraqi
army’s prompt advance to Kuwait’s border with Saudi Arabia, “[n]early half the
world’s oil reserves had fallen under the shadow of Saddam’s power”).
120. See VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE: LANDMARK BATTLES IN THE
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Conversely, the victim nation that is complacent in the face of threats
or aggression usually suffers long-term harm, such as loss of political
121
The results of unchecked aggression are
or territorial integrity.
thus comparable with the effects of battering in an abusive
relationship:
unlike an isolated act of battery or homicide,
unchecked aggression has a tremendous effect far outside the bounds
of the incident itself. Consequently, in order to defend its citizens
and its political, economic, and military interests, a threatened nation
must have at least as much flexibility to deal with a potential threat as
does a battered woman.
3.

Magnitude of harm
In addition to the similarities between battered women and
threatened nations, it is critical to note that the magnitude of harm
facing a threatened nation is relatively greater than that facing a
battered woman. A battered woman who kills her aggressor does so
122
because she believes her life to be in danger.
In an international
conflict, a nation acts in self-defense because it may be facing a threat
123
to its existence. A nation, as a political entity, is responsible for the
RISE OF WESTERN POWER 22 (2001) (“Western warring is often an extension of the
idea of state politics, rather than a mere effort to obtain territory, personal status,
wealth, or revenge.”); see, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, Justice and Injustice in the Gulf War, in
ARGUING ABOUT WAR, supra note 52, at 86-87 (suggesting that Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait would have given it leverage in subsequent negotiations which could have
resulted in a “settlement involving small or large concessions to the aggressor,” had
the United Nations not sanctioned an economic and military blockade of Iraq).
Another example is the 1982 British-Argentine war over the inconsequential
Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic. Fought by the British Navy thousands of miles
away from home, this conflict was compared by one contemporary to “two bald men
fighting over a comb.” HANSON, supra, at 446-47, 449. Success in this war,
nevertheless, assured Prime Minister Thatcher’s continuity at the forefront of British,
and hence international, politics. The SNP in Trouble: Fortunes of War, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 22, 1999, at 41, available at http://www.economist.com (search “The SNP in
trouble,” restrict search to “April, 1999”).
121. See, e.g., supra note 118 (citing Poland and Czechoslovakia as two countries
that lost their territorial and political integrity because of lack of resistance to
German aggression at the outset of World War II); POSNER, supra note 111, at 82-85
(explaining that the Israeli intelligence ignored warnings of an impending attack by
Syrian and Egyptian forces in 1973, almost leading to the destruction of Israel when
the surprise attack did take place); id. at 83 (citing Stalin’s “notorious failure” to act
in the face of “hundreds of warnings” of an impending German attack on the Soviet
Union, leading to immense territorial losses and deaths in the weeks following the
German invasion).
122. See supra notes 98-99 (explaining a battered woman’s perception of the
imminence of harm); see, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 633 (D.C.
1979) (noting the defendant’s claim that she believed her husband was going to kill
her).
123. See Rice, supra note 78 (observing that the events of 9/11 made it apparent
that “America faces an existential threat to [its] security,” and comparing the effects
of this threat to the possible alternative consequences of the Civil War or the Cold
War); cf. OREND, supra note 50, at 98 (suggesting that a small country like Israel has
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well-being of its citizens, and while death is arguably the most drastic
124
an individual’s death is less
harm that can befall a person,
significant than the deaths and destruction that ensue when a nation
125
is attacked, especially with non-conventional weapons.
Conforming to this balance of individual and national interests, it
is not unreasonable to suggest that in a situation where a nation
legitimately perceives itself to be under threat, it is acceptable for that
nation to err on the side of using its right to anticipatory self-defense
126
rather than to “patiently . . . await slaughter.” When this decision to
act is evaluated post factum, it must be considered from the viewpoint
of a nation in this situation if the principles of self-defense are to be
127
applied fairly to the potential victim of aggression.
C. The Current Approach for Evaluating Nations’ Claims of Self-Defense
Harms the Viability of the International Legal System
It is precisely because of a general lack of insight concerning
battered women’s perceptions of harm that courts allow admission of
128
expert witness testimony on BWS.
This testimony allows a jury to
evaluate the defendant’s perception of the threat facing her using a
different needs than a larger country in response to aggression, because “all [may
be] lost” if it does not respond effectively).
124. For the sake of argument, this Comment considers death to be a more
serious harm than physical or mental torture, enslavement, rape, etc., even though
some will probably disagree for reasons that may well be valid.
125. See Bush, supra note 6 (expressing the fear of “a day of horror like none we
have ever known,” which could have occurred if Saddam Hussein’s regime had
cooperated with a terrorist network to unleash chemical or biological weapons in the
United States); see also supra note 81 (discussing the destructive capabilities of a
nuclear strike).
126. See Glennon, supra note 68, at 553 (arguing that if a nation with adequate
military capacity has expressed willingness to inflict harm upon another nation, the
latter would be justified in striking preemptively, and even if a mistake is made, the
price of such a mistake should rightfully be borne “by states that so posture
themselves than by innocent states”). The Model Penal Code’s self-defense
provisions propose a similarly lenient treatment of mistake in criminal law. See
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04(1), 3.09(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (providing
that the use of force in self-defense is justifiable even if the actor is mistaken about
the necessity of using force, unless the actor’s mistake was due to recklessness or
negligence).
127. See DINSTEIN, supra note 55, at 173 (stating that in evaluating national selfdefense claims, hindsight knowledge is immaterial and that “[t]he invocation of the
right of self-defence must be weighed on the ground of the information available
(and reasonably interpreted) at the moment of action, without the benefit of post
factum wisdom”).
128. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 633 (D.C. 1979) (explaining
that the psychologist’s expertise is “beyond the ken of the average layman” and helps
the jury understand the situation from the defendant’s position). Expert testimony
provides the jury with insight about the effect of the battering on the defendant,
which the jury would otherwise not be able to deduce from the evidence, and which
can help the jury evaluate the credibility of the defendant’s testimony. Id.

SKOPETS.OFFTOPRINTER

2006]

2/23/2006 3:43:15 PM

BATTERED NATION SYNDROME

781

“reasonable battered woman” standard, rather than a purely objective
129
“reasonable person” standard. Similar concepts can and should be
applied to a nation claiming anticipatory self-defense. Thus, a
nation’s claim of anticipatory self-defense should be evaluated using a
“reasonable nation under threat” standard rather than a “reasonable
130
nation” standard.
An objective standard is not always applicable to national selfdefense claims in the modern political structure—when faced with a
threat, a nation will act as it feels it must, especially when its survival is
131
at stake.
Yet many scholars assert that a nation should not be its
own arbiter in determining whether its self-defense justification is
132
To this end, military experts and experts in
legitimate.
129. See Walker, supra note 31, at 322-23 (describing that expert testimony
explaining a battered woman’s, and specifically the defendant’s, view of the situation
she was in, allows a jury to better understand the defendant’s perception of the risk).
The “reasonable battered woman” standard is a hybrid one because it asks the jury to
consider what a reasonable person would do in the actor’s situation under the
circumstance as the actor believes them to be. See Hisham M. Ramadan,
Reconstructing Reasonableness in Criminal Law: Moderate Jury Instructions Proposal, 29 J.
LEGIS. 233, 235 & n.14, 236 (2003) (explaining the “hybrid subjective/objective
standard of reasonableness” as the “reasonable person” standard with some
subjective elements infused into it, and providing examples from several criminal
cases).
130. Cf. Yoo, supra note 75, at 567 (asserting that when evaluating a nation’s claim
of self-defense, the focus must be on that nation’s “reasonabl[e] underst[anding of]
the facts . . . at the start of hostilities,” rather than any additional evidence that may
have come to light afterwards); Polebaum, supra note 76, at 208-09 (suggesting that
the actions of a nation that strikes preemptively to prevent a nuclear attack should be
analyzed under a “two-tiered analysis,” which would determine the reasonableness of
the threatened nation’s perceptions and whether a “reasonable nation” with the
same perceptions would have acted in the same way); infra note 131 (citing Glennon
for the proposition that states must evaluate threats subjectively); see, e.g., supra note
123 (explaining why Israel needs to use different standards than a larger country in
calculating a response to a potential threat).
131. See Glennon, supra note 68, at 558 (claiming that “states will continue to
judge for themselves what measure of force is required for their self-defense . . .
because defense is necessary for survival and survival is intrinsic in the very fact of
statehood”); Yoo, supra note 18, at 749-50 (asserting that nations that feel threatened
may not adhere to the restrictions posed by the U.N. Charter, and furthermore, that
many scholars believe that the “rules on the use of force have been widely flouted” in
the last century); Polebaum, supra note 76, at 196 (suggesting that international legal
standards of self-defense “cannot be expected to control the initial decision of a
nation to strike defensively,” especially in the event of a nuclear crisis); Glennon,
supra note 68, at 552 (“Waiting for an aggressor to fire the first shot may be a fitting
code for television westerns but it is unrealistic for policy-makers entrusted with . . .
the well-being of their citizenry.”); cf. Bush, supra note 6 (announcing that the
United States does not have to wait for a threat to develop because “[s]ince when
have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice
before they strike?”).
132. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 319 (5th ed. 1955) (“[Self-defense] is not a question on
which a state is entitled, in any special sense, to be a judge in its own cause.”). Brierly
also explains that while a state will necessarily make the initial decision of whether
defensive force is necessary, that decision should “afterwards be reviewed by the law

SKOPETS.OFFTOPRINTER

782

2/23/2006 3:43:15 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:753

international relations and diplomacy can play the same role as
expert witnesses in a BWS trial by providing subjective insight into the
motives and perceptions of threatened nations.
Furthermore, the determination of whether a nation acted within
the law is just as important for the well-being of the international
legal order as it is in the determination of the legal consequences
133
facing that nation.
International law “derives from state behavior
134
and it affects state behavior” —customary international law is based
135
In domestic law, the longon generally accepted state practices.
standing concept of desuetude posits that a law becomes obsolete
136
through a history of non-enforcement in the face of its violation.
Desuetude is just as applicable in international law, whereby a
doctrine based on customary international law or a treaty can become
137
obsolete if nations consistently violate it with no repercussions.
If
nations disregard anticipatory self-defense laws because of the
impractical strictness of the imminence requirement, the
international legal system will suffer whether a nation in a particular
incident is justified or not. There is a need, therefore, to clarify and
modify existing laws and treaties that govern the use of force in selfin the light of all the circumstances.” BRIERLY, supra note 7, at 407-08; see also The
Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 100 (1947) (rejecting Germany’s proposition that it
alone could decide whether circumstances warranted preventive actions, and
directing that such claims be independently investigated); Kunz, supra note 69, at
879 (commenting that the nations involved in a conflict should leave the
determination of who the initial aggressor was and whether a self-defense claim was
legitimate to the United Nations Security Council).
133. See supra note 56 (quoting the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
to this effect).
134. Mark A. Drumbl, Self-Defense, Preemption, Fear: Iraq, and Beyond 9 (Washington
& Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 03-04, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=382863 (observing that international law has a normative
function and influences politics and state behavior just as it draws from politics and
state behavior).
135. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, § 2, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, U.N.T.S. 993 (listing “international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law” as one of the four sources of international law used by the
Court); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (6th ed.
2003) (emphasizing that Article 38 of the ICJ Statute “is generally regarded as a
complete statement of the sources of international law”).
136. See Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720,
725 & n.3 (W. Va. 1992) (tracing the history of desuetude to Roman law, which
provided that statutes could be repealed “by the silent agreement of everyone
expressed through desuetude”). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the concept of
desuetude in Poe v. Ullman, where it stated that a single prosecution of a state statute
over the previous eighty-two years constituted a “nullification by Connecticut of
[this] law[] throughout all the long years that [it has] been on the statute books.”
367 U.S. 497, 502 (1961), quoted in Printz, 416 S.E.2d at 726.
137. See Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 942
(2005) (maintaining that desuetude applies to international law and occurs when “a
sufficient number of states join in breaching a rule, causing a new custom to
emerge”).
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defense so they can be more reflective of the subtleties of
international conflicts and will less likely be flouted by the members
of the international community.
CONCLUSION
National defense policies must have more flexibility than
traditional self-defense laws in the criminal context allow for and
should rely on a broader interpretation of the strict imminence
requirement.
As in battered women’s self-defense cases, the
evaluation of a claim of anticipatory self-defense must allow for the
consideration of additional information, such as the probability and
certainty of attack, and the potential consequences of refraining from
preemptive defensive action.
This Comment does not propose a new methodology for evaluating
states’ self-defense claims but points to a new direction for existing
laws. Legal principles addressing questions of national self-defense
should be modified, and it is important that they incorporate a more
relaxed imminence requirement, thus allowing nations to act legally
in accord with the ever-changing nature of international conflicts.
The body of international law must not only be reasonable but also
applicable to political and military realities. Then, when scholars or
politicians use it to condemn a nation’s behavior, they will not be
undermining the integrity of the international legal system.

